Earnings Management, CEO Domination, and Growth Opportunities: Evidence from Taiwan

Abstract

Prior research on the relation between corporate governance characteristics and earnings management suggests that corporate governance controls are important to mitigate firms opportunistic behavior. The study addresses the impact of regulatory changes of the Corporate Governance Best-Practice Principles (CGBPP) on earnings management phenomenon for Taiwanese listed companies. We find that listed firms in Taiwan engage less earnings management following the enactment of the CGBPP. This study also incorporates an important environmental factor, growth opportunities, in this emerging market to examine whether independent (i.e., non-CEO dominated) corporate boards are associated with less earnings management. We find that high-growth firms with independent corporate boards in the post-CGBPP era are associated with less earnings management. In addition, we also provide evidence that independent corporate boards are associated with less earnings management. Overall, our findings shed light on the importance of corporate governance reforms in mitigating opportunistic earnings management behavior in an emerging market where growth-option rich industries are prevalent.